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Abstract: The first decade of the fourteenth century was a period of political, 
military and financial crisis in Byzantium. The inability of the government of 
Andronikos II Palaiologos (1282-1328) to resist the expansion of the Turcoman 
principalities caused the dissatisfaction of the Anatolian soldiers and resulted in 
a series of revolts and conspiracies. One of these was the revolt of Kassianos in 
Mesothynia in 1306. The analysis of this local rebellion contributes to the better 
understanding of the military developments in Asia Minor in the first decade of 
the fourteenth century.
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Resumen: La primera década del siglo XIV fue un período de crisis política, 
militar y financiera en Bizancio. La incapacidad del gobierno de Andrónico II 
Paleólogo (1282-1228) de resistir la expansión de los principados turcomanos 
causó la insatisfacción de los soldados anatolios y tuvo como consecuencia una 
serie de revueltas y conspiraciones. Una de ellas fue la revuelta de Casiano en 
Mesopotamia en 1306. El análisis de esta rebelión local contribuye a una mejor 
comprensión de los desarrollos militares en Asia Menor en la primera década del 
siglo XIV.
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The long reign of Andronikos II Palaiologos (1282-1328) is commonly seen and described by modern scholars as a period of political and economic crisis1. It was during Andronikos II’s reign that Byzantium 
suffered substantial territorial losses, most of Asia Minor was lost to the Turks and 
the empire experienced a severe political crisis in the first decade of the fourteenth 
century. The work of George Pachymeres, whose History is the main source for 
the reign of Andronikos II up to 1307, and numismatic evidence suggest that 
in the 1290s the economic affairs of the empire deteriorated dramatically and in 
the 1300s the state was effectively bankrupt2. A consequence of this profound 
political, military and financial crisis was the dissatisfaction of the army and its 
leaders which resulted in a series of conspiracies and rebellions. One of these was 
the revolt of the general Kassianos in Mesothynia in 1306 which is known to us 
through the account of Pachymeres3.
Discussing the military and political developments in Asia Minor in the 
first decade of the fourteenth century, Pachymeres comments that in 1306, 
Andronikos II sent his in-law (gamvros), Kassianos to Mesothynia to take charge 
of the situation there. He adds that,
“Kassianos had already been for some time in the fortresses of the 
area, when the council around the emperor decided to collect the usual 
taxes from the properties to pay the salaries of the army stationed there. 
Kassianos, either leading the people in a manner of a demagogue, 
or because of some other thought, seized Bardales, who had been 
sent there to collect the taxes and inflicted many wounds on him”.
1 The most detailed account of the reign of Andronikos II is Laiou, A. (1972). Constantinople and the 
Latins: The Foreign Policy of Andronikos, 1282-1328. Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press.
2 See Smyrlis, K. (2013). “Financial crisis and the limits of taxation under Andronikos II Palaiologos 
(1282-1321)”, in eds. Angelov, D.- Saxby, M. (2013)  Power and Subversion in Byzantium, 
Farnham: Ashgate, 72.
3  The precise location of Mesothynia has not been determined with certainty. It is part of Bithynia 
and it seems that it can be identified with the region north of Nicaea. See Geanakoplos, D. 
(1959) Emperor Michael Palaiologos and the West. A Study in Byzantine-Latin Relations. 1258-
1282. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 27 n 44.
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Pachymeres remarks that when Bardales returned to Constantinople, 
“Having accepted the words of somebody else, he reported 
the worst against him (Kassianos); that he had decided to form 
a marriage alliance with the Persian (Turk) and make a common 
cause with him against the interests of the empire. For that reason 
he was ordered to present and defend himself before the emperor. 
However, being despaired, Kassianos postponed his trip to the 
emperor. And having gained the support of soldiers, he sent to 
the emperor requesting assurances for his safety from the part 
of the emperor and advanced without being harassed. When 
he established himself in Chele, Kassianos believed that he had 
received the guarantees for his safety. Some of the inhabitants of 
Chele, who happened to be in the city, made an agreement with 
the emperor to seize the fugitive by trickery and hand him over to 
those who were to lead him to the emperor”.
Eventually, together with an unidentified eunuch these locals seized Kassianos 
and sent him to the emperor in chains. Pachymeres concludes his account of the 
incident stating that the emperor, “Put him into prison together with Kotanitzes, 
because it was proven that he had written a letter to his sympetheros, the epi 
tou kanikleiou (Nikephoros Choumnos), in which he threatened to organize a 
rebellion similar to that of Kotanitzes if he was not pardoned by the emperor. 
And it seemed then that the emperor lost the best of his generals”4.
Rather little is known about Kassianos’ career5. Pachymeres calls him an in-
law of the emperor. However, he is not known to have been married to any 
legitimate daughter of Andronikos II. Probably, he was married to one of his 
nieces or illegitimate daughters. Kassianos was also an in-law, (sympetheros), of 
4 Pachymeres George, GerogesPachymérès. Relations historiques, ed. Failler, A. (1984-2000) 5 vols. 
Paris: Institut Français d'Études Byzantines, IV, 681. Kotanitzes Tornikios was a Byzantine 
renegade who had joined the Serbians. He participated in a Serbian attack against Macedonia 
in 1280. He was captured by the Byzantines but in 1283 he escaped and joined the Serbian 
ruler Stefan Uroš Milutin (1282-1321). He led Serbian attacks on the Byzantine frontier. The 
Serbians handed him over to the Byzantines as part of a peace agreement.  Pachymeres, III, 
599, IV, 298-301; Nikephoros Gregoras, Nicephori Graegorae Byzantina Historia, ed. Schopen 
L.- Bekker, I. (1829-1855). 3 vols. Bonn: Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae, I, 202-
203; Trapp, E. (1976-1996). Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palaiologenzeit, Vienna: Verlag 
der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, nr. 13317.
5 Prosopographisches Lexikon, nr.11346.
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the close associate of Andronikos II, Nikephoros Choumnos6. Kassianos’ status 
as a member of the extended imperial family must have been an important 
criterion for his appointed as a governor of an important province which was 
threatened by the raids of the Turks. He also held the office of megas primmikerios 
the holders of which were predominantly military men7.
Kassianos appears for the first time in the Histories of Pachymeres during 
the conflict between the Byzantine state and the Catalan Grand Company of 
mercenaries.  As a consequence of the disagreements, misunderstandings and 
conflict with the government of Andronikos II, the Catalans abandoned Asia 
Minor and in 1305 moved to Europe and established themselves in Gallipoli8. 
Meanwhile, Kassianos was one of the generals of the army of the co-emperor 
Michael IX Palaiologos (1294-1320) in Adrianople. More specifically, Kassianos 
together with the megas hetaireiarches Nostogos Doukas were in charge of the 
native Byzantine soldiers of the army. It cannot be excluded that Kassianos 
was one of the commanders of the army Michael IX had led against the Turks 
in Magnesia in 13029. Following the failure of this campaign, Michael IX 
withdrew to Thrace and established his court in Adrianople. Pachymeres adds 
that Kassianos and Nostogos Doukas were also put in charge of the fortresses 
that the emperor had ordered to be evacuated by their inhabitants due to the 
inroads of the Catalans10. Shortly after the killing of the leader of the Catalan 
Grand Company, Roger de Flor in Adrianople, Michael IX sent a force under 
Kassianos to besiege Gallipoli. According to Pachymeres, Kassianos was defeated 
due to the inefficiency of his troops11. Kassianos was one of the generals in the 
battle of Apros (20 June 1305) where the Catalans crushed the Byzantines who 
were led by Michael IX. Pachymeres remarks that Kassianos was in charge of the 
Macedonian troops12. There is no information about Kassianos’ activities in the 
period between the battle of Apros and his appointment in Mesothynia.
            
 
 
6 For Choumos see Prosopographisches Lexikon, nr. 30961; Verpeaux, J. (1959). Nicéphore Choumnos. 
Homme d’ état et humaniste Byzantin (ca.1250/1255-1327). Paris: A. et J. Picard.
7 See Guilland, R. (1967). Recherches sur les institutions Byzantines, 2 vols. Amsterdam: Hakkert, 
I, 312-332. 
8 For an analysis of the Catalan campaign and the conflict between the Catalans and the empire see 
Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins, 131-232.
9 Pachymeres, IV, 343-349; Gregoras, I, 205. For Michael IX’s campaign see Laiou, Constantinople 
and the Latins, 90-91.
10 Pachymeres, IV, 573.
11 Pachymeres, IV, 577; Ramon Muntaner, Crònica, (1999). ed. Escartí, V.J. 2 vols. Valencia: 
Institució Alfons el Magnànim, II, 448-450.
12 These Macedonians were most likely native Byzantines from what is today’s Thrace. Pachymeres, 
IV, 599-601; Gregoras, I, 227-232; Muntaner, 458-460.
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Pachymeres relates that Andronikos II sent Kassianos to Mesothynia at a time 
when he was facing difficulties on every front. Indeed, after crushing Michael 
IX’s army in Apros, the Catalans began to ravage Thrace without the Byzantines 
being able to recruit a field army to face them on the battlefield. In fact, the 
public treasure experienced such a shortage of funds that even before the battle 
of Apros, in 1304, Michael IX had most of the silver and gold wares of his 
personal property minted into coins in order to raise an army13. The situation 
in Bithynia was not better.  Since the last decades of the thirteenth century the 
Turks had been raiding and plundering the countryside of the important cities 
of Nicaea, Nikomedia and Prusa. The situation deteriorated after the battle of 
Bapheus near Nikomedia (27 July 1302) where the Ottomans under Osman 
defeated the Byzantines who were led by Leo Mouzalon. Pachymeres reports 
that Osman’s successes attracted more Turcoman warriors on his side who helped 
him expand his possessions and influence at the expense of the Byzantines14. 
It is in these unfavourable political and military circumstances that Kassianos 
was sent to govern Mesothynia. Pachymeres does not provide details regarding 
his authority. Nonetheless, it seems safe to conclude that, like all provincial 
governors of the period, Kassianos was in charge of both the military and civil 
affairs of the province he was assigned to govern15. 
Pachymeres begins his account of Kassianos’ revolt stating that when the 
council around the emperor decided to collect the usual taxes from the properties 
in order to pay the salaries of the army, Kassianos had the tax collector, the 
orphanotrophos Leo Bardales, seized and beaten16. The statement that the imperial 
council took the decision to impose taxes reflects the style of government of 
Andronikos II. Pachymeres gives the impression that under Andronikos II the 
council around the emperor, which was composed of high-ranking officials, was 
not merely an advisory body. It could take decisions in important matters. For 
instance, Pchymeres relates that the council decided to the funding of a military 
13 Pachymeres, IV, 491. 
14 Pachymeres, IV, 365-369. For the battle of Bapheus see Inalcik, H. (1993). “Osman’s Ghazi’s 
siege of Nicaea and the battle of Bapheus”,  in  ed. Zachariadou, E. (1993) The Ottoman Emirate. 
1300-1389. Rethymnon: Crete University Press, 77-99; Kravari, V. “Évocations médiévales”, in 
eds. Geyer, B.- Lefort, J. (2003). La Bithynie au Moyen Âge. Paris: Lethielleux, 92-96.
15 Pachymeres (IV, 681) states that Kassianos was sent to arrange the affairs of Mesothynia. For 
the military authority of the provincial governors in the fourteenth century see Maksimovic, 
L. (1988). The Byzantine Provincial Administration under the Palaiologoi. Amsterdam: Hakkert, 
147-148.
16 For Bardales see Prosopographisches Lexikon, nr.2183.
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campaign on Thessaly in 1283 and it was the council’s suggestion to reduce the 
military fleet in 128517.
The customary taxes on land property Bardales was sent to collect must have 
been taxes levied on holders of imperial grants of fiscal revenues. Pachymeres 
indicates that it was not uncommon for the government of Andronikos II 
to impose such taxes. He reports that in 1283 Andronikos had planned the 
campaign of Michael Tarchaneiotes in Thessaly to be funded through the 
imperial treasury. Eventually, he accepted the proposal of the imperial council 
and the funds for this military operation were collected through the imposition 
of a new tax. This was a 10% levy “on the pronoiai of those having pronoiai,” as 
Pachymeres remarks. He adds that, while this was collected ostensibly from the 
owners of the grants, the paroikoi paid everything. This implies that the holders 
of imperial privileges could pass the fiscal demands of the state to their depended 
peasants18. In 1295, Andronikos II settled Cretan mercenary soldiers in Anatolia. 
Pachymeres, relates that due to the lack of money the government imposed again 
a 10% levy on imperial grants. He identifies this tax with the one imposed in 
1284.  As he writes, “this was, as said earlier the tenth of the pronoia of each.” 
Pachymeres concludes that because the possessors of these grants were deprived 
of money the burden was again on the paroikoi.  Being critical of the fiscal policies 
of Andronikos II, Pachymeres comments that this caused great distress to the 
paroikoi who were so desperate that they did not know what suffering will inflict 
them19. Moreover, describing the measures Andronikos II took in order to afford 
the salaries of the Catalan Grand Company in 1304, Pachymeres relates that the 
emperor appropriated one third of the pronoiai of the western parts of the empire 
(European provinces)20. Bartusis has recently argued that this information is not 
confirmed by documentary evidence and therefore, Pachymeres should refer 
again to a tax on imperial grants which was higher than the ones imposed in 
17 Pachymeres, III, 81, 121; Gregoras, I, 174-175; Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins, 38-39, 
74-76. 
18 Pachymeres, III, 81; Laiou, A. (2000). “Le débat sur les droits du fisc et les droits régaliens 
au début du 14e siècle”, Revue des Études Byzantines 58, 102; idem, Constantinople and the 
Latins, 38-39; Bartusis, M. (2012).  Land and Privilege in Byzantium. The Institution of Pronoia. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 433.
19 Pachymeres, III, 237; Laiou, Constantinople and Latins, 117,123; Bartusis, Land and Privilege, 
433. For Pachymeres’ criticism of the Palaiologoi see Angelov, D. (2007). Imperial Ideology and 
Political thought in Byzantium. 1204-1328. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 260-280.
20 Pachymeres, IV, 541; Laiou, “Le débat”, 103; idem, Constantinople and the Latins, 141, 188; 
Smyrlis, “Financial Crisis”, 75.
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1284 and 129521. Therefore, it is probable that the “customary taxes from the 
properties” Bardales was sent to collect the tax on imperial grants which was 
levied for the first time in 1284. Nevertheless, it is interesting that while in 1304 
the emperor taxed only the imperial fiscal privileges in the western parts of the 
empire, in 1306 the imperial council decided to collect taxes from Mesothynia. 
The lack of sources prevents us from reaching any conclusions concerning this 
development. It may be assumed that on the eve of the Catalan campaign it 
was impossible for the empire to collect taxes from Asia Minor, or that the 
emperor wished to raise funds for the Catalans without burdening the Anatolian 
provinces. Furthermore, it is obvious that the decision to impose a tax on the 
revenues the holders of pronoiai had received as privileges from the throne reveals 
the severity of the financial crisis the empire was experiencing. 
Pachymeres relates that Kassianos had Bardales seized either because he 
wanted to act as demagogue, or due to another reason. This statement shows that 
Pachymeres was uncertain whether Kassianos mistreated Bardales in order to gain 
popularity among the army and the local population. Trying to gain the support 
of the local population by mistreating state officials was something that a rebel 
was expected to do. For instance, in 1295, in order to satisfy the anti-aristocratic 
sentiment of the local soldiers, Alexios Philanthropenos, whose rebellion in the 
area around the Maeander was far more serious and of much larger-scale than 
that of Kassianos, had the emperor’s brother, Theodore Palaiologos arrested in 
Ephessos22. Nonetheless, as has been stated above, Pachymeres remarks that 
Kassianos might have had other motives. One wonders whether there were 
any personal differences between Kassianos and Bardales. Like Kassianos, the 
orphanotrophos Leo Bardales was a military man. He was a friend of Maximos 
Planoudes and in the late 1290s was active in Asia Minor. A letter of Planoudes 
indicates that Bardales was in conflict with another local general, most likely 
John Tarchaneiotes whom Andronikos II had sent in 1298 in Anatolia to 
reorganize the Byzantine military forces23. It is expected that during a period 
 21 Bartusis, Land and Privilege , 435. 
22 Pachymeres, III, 245. For Philanthropenos’ rebellion see Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins, 80-
84; idem. (1978). “Some Observations on Alexios Philanthropenos and Maximos Planoudes”, 
Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 4, 89-99.
23 Maximos Planoudes, Maximi Moachi Planudis Epistulae, ed. A. Leone (1991). Amsterdam: 
Hakkert, 11-12; Pachymeres, III, 285-289; Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins, 20-23, 34-36; 
For the career of Leo Bardales see Sevcenko, I. (1949). “Léon Bardales et les juges géneraux, ou 
la corruption des incorruptible”, Byzantion, 19, 247-259.
Byzantion Nea Hellás N° 33 - 2014: 165-180
172
Savvas Kyriakidis: The revolt of the general Kassianos in Mesothynia (1306)
of crisis, territorial reduction and military failures there would be antagonism 
among military leaders. However, the lack of sources prevents us from reaching 
any conclusions regarding possible conflicts between Bardales and Kassianos.
Unsurprisingly, when Bardales returned to Constantinople, reported his 
mistreatment to the emperor. Pachymeres implies that the most serious accusation 
made by Bardales against Kassianos was that the latter was planning a marriage 
alliance with the Turk. It is certain that this Turk was Osman, who was the Turkish 
chieftain active in Bithynia. Pachymeres does not seem convinced that Kassianos 
had planned to form an alliance with the Turks. As he remarks, “Bardales 
accepted the words of someone else.” Consequently, Bardales’ statement against 
Kassianos could have been a slanderous accusation. Nonetheless, it seems that 
Kassianos was convinced that the emperor would accept Bardales’ accusations. 
To avoid certain conviction, Kassianos decided not to present himself to the 
emperor and together with an unknown number of soldiers he occupied the 
fortress of Chele (modern Şile) and demanded assurances for his safety in order 
to travel to Constantinople. 
Pachymeres indicates that after moving to Chele, Kassianos sent a letter to 
Nikephoros Choumnos claiming that he would revolt unless he was pardoned 
by the emperor. Kassianos’ letter to Choumnos raises the question whether he 
had planned his revolt when he mistreated Bardales, or he was forced to revolt 
because Bardales’ accusations left him with no other option. Regardless of the 
exact nature of Kassianos’ plans, the emperor had good reasons to believe that 
Kassianos had planned a marriage alliance with the Ottomans. He would not 
have been the first Byzantine governor and general to do, or to contemplate 
to do so. Pachymeres reports that during his campaign in 1295 in Asia Minor, 
Alexios Philantropenos encountered the widow of the Turcoman leader Menteşe. 
He comments that Philanthropenos proposed to marry her. According to 
Pachymeres, this was a trick to capture the Turcoman fort. Nonetheless, one 
wonders whether a marriage with the widow of a prominent Turcoman leader 
would have served Philanthropenos’ plans for his revolt24. In 1299, the daughter 
of the Byzantine governor of “Aydos” was married to Osman’s son and successor, 
Orhan (1326-1362)25. 
 
24 Pachymeres, III, 239.
25 Âşık Paşazade. Osmanoĝulları’ nın tarihi, eds. Yavuz, K.- Yekta Saraç, M.A.(2003). Istanbul: 
Koç Kültür Sanat Tandim, §26; Bryer, A. (1981). “Greek Historians  on the Turks: the Case 
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Moreover, Kassianos refused to present himself to Constantinople because 
he could recall the fate of other prominent military leaders in Asia Minor who 
had been accused of treason under Andronikos II. These were more prominent 
and closer to the throne generals than Kassianos. In 1292, the emperor’s younger 
brother Constantine Palaiologos and the protostrator Michael Strategopoulos 
were accused of plotting to seize the throne and were arrested. The pretext for 
Constantine’s fall into disgrace was his reaction to an incident involving his wife’s 
order of precedence in a ceremony during the festivities of the Apostles Peter and 
Paul26. However, soon Constantine was accused of plotting against the emperor. 
As is the case with Kassianos’ revolt, Pachymeres gives the impression that 
Andronikos II accepted the accusations various men made against Constantine 
without carrying out a thorough investigation27. It was said that Constantine was 
Michael VIII’s favourite son. He possessed enormous wealth and was accused 
of using it to create his personal base of loyal supporters. Pachymeres remarks 
that the accusations against Constantine “appeared plausible to those who heard 
them”28. In March 1294, an assembly of magnates and clergymen who were 
called by the emperor found Constantine and Strategopoulos guilty of treason. 
They were not released from prison until their death29. It is interesting that while 
Pachymeres keeps a relatively neutral stance towards Constantine, Gregoras fully 
accepts his innocence30. In 1295, Alexios Philanthropenos was captured by the 
Cretan mercenaries who had initially incited him to revolt. Eventually, he was 
handed over to the governor of the theme of Neokastra, Libadarios, who had 
him blinded31. In 1304, the emperor’s brother-in-law, Michael Angelos, who 
had joined Michael IX in Asia Minor in 1302, was accused of creating a private 
retinue composed of disposed soldiers from Asia Minor from whom he secretly 
demanded an oath of allegiance32. Moreover in 1305, a serious plot to overthrow 
of the First Byzantine-Ottoman marriage”, eds. in Davis, R.H.C. - Wallace-Hardill, J.H.M. 
The Writing of History in the Middle Ages. Essays Presented to Richard William Southern. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 471-493; Hopwood, K. (1999). “The Byzantine-Turkish Frontier, ca. 1250-
1300”, in eds. Kohbach, M.-Procházka-Eisl, G.- Römer , C Acta Viennensia Ottomanica. Vienna: 
Selbstverlag des Instituts fur Orientalistik, 159.
26 Pachymeres, I, 173; Failler, A. (1990). “Chronologie et composition dans l’ Histoire de George 
Pachymérès (livres VII-XII)”, Revue des Études Byzantines, 48, 17-20. 
27 Pachymeres, III, 177-179. 
28 Pachymeres, III, 179.
29 Pachymeres, III, 181-183.
30 Gregoras, I, 186-191.
31 Pachyemeres, III, 251-253.
32 Pachymeres, III, 435-37.
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the emperor, which involved military officers and refugees from Asia Minor, was 
averted and its leaders were imprisoned33. 
Kassianos was supported by an unknown number of soldiers who followed 
him to the fortress of Chele. To understand the motives of Kassianos’ followers 
it is necessary to summarize the position of the Byzantine soldiers in the last 
decades of the thirteenth century, as it is described by Pachymeres.  In the preface 
of his work Pachymeres describes how the Laskarid rulers of the so-called empire 
of Nicaea reinforced the defence of its eastern frontier by providing incentives 
(pronoia grants, tax exemptions, cash) to local troops to remain to their lands 
and defend them against the raids of Turcoman chiefdoms which were not under 
the control of the Seljuk sultanate of Rum34. A few months after the recovery 
of Constantinople, in December 1261, Michael VIII faced a popular revolt in 
Zegynoi, in the frontier region south east of Nicaea35. In the wake of this revolt 
Michael VIII sent Constantine Chadenos to Anatolia to reform the remuneration 
of the Anatolian troops36. Scholars have expressed different views regarding 
the nature of Chadenos’ reforms. Others claimed that Chadenos reduced the 
holdings of the wealthy frontier guards and others concluded that he conducted 
a reassessment of the pronoiai of these troops37. Most recently, Bartusis has shown 
that Chadenos turned these frontier guards into mercenaries38. Pachymeres 
implies that a consequence of Chadenos’ reforms was the decline of the system 
of the frontier guards. He remarks that the payments that have been assigned to 
the soldiers in the frontier were discontinued, since those in charge were stingy 
and the leaders of the army kept most of the share of the soldiers in the manner 
of thieves. As a result, as Pachymeres continues, many soldiers were either lost, 
or joined the enemy while others became brigands and terrorized the local 
population39. Pachymeres’ conclusion seems to be confirmed by Gregoras who 
33 Pachymeres, IV, 653; Failler, A. (1996). “Le complot antidynastique de Jean Drimys”, Revue des 
Études Byzantines, 54, 235-244.
34 Pachymeres, I, 29-31. For the frontier guards see Oikonomides, N. (1981). “À propos des armées 
des premières Paléologues et les compagnies de soldats”, Travaux et Mémoires, 8, 359; Bartusis. 
M. (1990). “On the Problem of Smallholding Soldiers in Late Byzantium”, Dumbarton Oaks 
Papers, 44, 2-3; idem. (1992). The Late Byzantine Army, 1204-1453. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania 
University Press, 25-26; idem, Land and Privilege, 226-227.
35 Pachymeres, I, 259-263.
36 Pachymeres, I, 31-33. For Constantine Chadenos see Prosopographisches Lexikon, nr. 30346.
37 See Bartusis, M. (2008). “The Chadenos Affair (Pachymeres, Book 1, Chapters 5-6)”, Zbornik 
Radova Vizantološkog Instituta, 45, 161.
38 Bartusis, “The Chadenos Affair”, 157-168.
39 Pachymeres, I, 35. 
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writing about events from the 1270s remarks that the guards of the frontier had 
migrated a few years earlier because their annual stipends were discontinued40. 
Moreover, Pachymeres comments repeatedly that the Anatolian provinces had 
been overtaxed by corrupt and unworthy officials41. 
Consequently, the impression given by Pachymeres is that since the 1260s 
the soldiers of Anatolia were deeply disaffected by the policies of Michael VIII, 
who seems to have mistrusted them. Being threatened by the increased raids of 
the Turcomans and neglected by the government, these troops became prone to 
revolt and supported ambitious military commanders. Most of these generals had 
limited or no personal ties with Asia Minor. Nonetheless, their military reputation 
was sufficient to lead local disgruntled soldiers to rally around them. As is the 
case with Kassianos, these commanders revolted either in order to promote their 
personal interests, or they were forced to rebellion because they were slandered 
or suspected by the throne. In 1280, John Doukas Angelos, who in the 1270s 
achieved victories against the Turks, was accused of insulting Constantine 
Palaiologos (Michael VIII’s second son). He was arrested and blinded. Almost at 
the same time, the general of Herakleia on the Black Sea, Michael Srategopoulos 
was arrested under the accusation of plotting against the emperor42. 
The attempts of Michael VIII’s successor, Andronikos II to reinforce the frontier 
had limited effect and did not improve the fortunes of local soldiers. The rhetoric 
of the revolt of Alexios Philanthropenos in 1295, as reported by Pachymeres 
reflects the complaints of the local soldiers against the throne and the ruling elite. 
Pachymeres writes that many soldiers who joined the revolt believed that while 
they were fighting, the Constantinopolitan elite were enjoying the fruits of their 
struggle and leading a luxurious life, without satisfying the needs of the soldiers43. 
In 1298, Andronikos II sent John Tarchaneiotes in Asia Minor to re-organize the 
armies of Asia Minor44. Philanthropenos’ revolt and the failure of the reforms of 
John Tarchaneiotes seem to have led Andronikos II’s to the decision to employ 
mercenaries from outside the empire for the defence of Asia Minor.  Discussing 
the employment of Alan mercenaries in 1301, Pachymeres criticizes Andronikos 
40 Gregoras, I, 138; Bartusis, “The Chadenos’ Affair”, 158.
41 Pachymeres, I, 291-293, II, 405-407, 633-635, III, 235.
42 Pachymeres, II, 613-617, 621-623.
43 Pachymeres, III, 241.
44 Pachymeres, IV, 285-289; Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins, 87-89; Oikonomides, “À propos 
des armées”, 354; Bartusis, The Late Byzantine Army, 75-76.
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II for neglecting the native soldiers in favour of foreign mercenaries. Similarly, 
Gregoras comments that after the rebellion of Philanthropenos, Andronikos II 
“day and night he was dreaming of overseas alliances”45. In his account of the 
battle of Bapheus in 1302 Pachymeres implies that the employment of the Alan 
mercenaries had a damaging effect on the morale of the native soldiers.  He writes 
that the Byzantine soldiers were unwilling to fight because of the money and 
weapons that had been taken away from them to supply the Alan mercenaries46. 
Describing events shortly after the battle of Bapheus, Pachymeres relates that 
in 1303 the government considered to reinforce the defence in Asia Minor by 
confiscating and distributing grants of land which had belonged to ecclesiastical 
institutions and wealthy individuals who had abandoned them.  The government 
was hoping that the new holders would be motivated to fight for the source 
of their incomes47. This plan was never materialised and as Pachymeres relates, 
shortly afterwards many soldiers of the vassilika allagia, which were units of 
the field army stationed in Asia Minor, migrated from Asia to the west due 
to the inroads of the Turks48. Being disaffected and alienated by the inability 
of the throne to protect their interests and having suffered the economic and 
social consequences of the Turcoman raids and expansion, the remaining soldiers 
became prone to rally around rebellious generals or to support individuals of 
obscure origin, such as the Bulgarian John Choirovoskos, who leading a band of 
300 archers and mace-bearers offered to fight against the Turks in 130449. 
Furthermore, many soldiers and local commanders in Bithynia appear to have 
begun to co-operate with the Turks. Pachymeres remarks that since the reign of 
Michael VIII Byzantine soldiers had begun to join the enemy. Nonetheless, it 
seems that in the first decade of the fourteenth the number of Byzantine soldiers 
and local commanders who joined the Turks was increased. One wonders 
whether it is a coincidence that the appearance of individuals such as the 
Christian collaborator of Osman, Köse Mihal, who is identified as the head of 
   
 
    e deidad en las antiguas cosmogonías
45 Pachymeres, IV, 339; Gregoras, I, 205; Kyriakidis, S. (2009). “The Employment of Large 
Groups of Mercenaries in Byzantium in the Period ca. 1290-1305 as Viewed by the Sources”, 
Byzantion, 79, 212.
46 Pachymeres, IV, 367; Kyriakidis, S. Warfare in Late Byzantium, 1204-1453, Leiden, 2011, 
120-121; S. Jesee-A. Isaenko. (2013). “The Military Effectiveness of Alan Mercenaries in 
Byzantium. 1301-1306”, Journal of Medieval Military History, 11, 107-131.
47 Pachymeres, IV, 425-427; Kyriakidis, Warfare in Late Byzantium, 77. For the dating of these 
events see Failler, A. (1993). “Pachymeriana alia”, Revue des Études Byzantines, 51, 248-258.
48 Pachymeres, IV, 447.
49 Pachymeres, IV, 487-489; For Choirovoskos see Prosopographisches Lexikon, nr. 30786.
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the fortress of Harmankaya in the Ottoman chronicles, coincides chronologically 
with Pachymeres’ aforementioned remarks that in 1303 and 1304 many soldiers 
had lost their pronoiai.50 Consequently, it is obvious that Kassianos’ followers 
were desperate soldiers who were experiencing the economic, social and political 
consequences of the collapse of imperial control over Asia Minor. 
The fact that Kassianos was seized by inhabitants of Chele raises the question 
whether he had received any support from the local population or the aristocracy. 
On the one hand, that he was captured and handed over to the authorities by 
locals does not prove that the majority of the population of Mesothynia was 
hostile towards him. On the other hand, there is no evidence to suggest that 
apart from the soldiers who were stationed in Mesothynia any other group 
supported Kassianos. Moreover, Kassianos’ rebellion does not seem to have 
received the backing of members of the higher aristocracy. Pachymeres indicates 
that Kassianos’ letter to Nikephoros Choumnos was merely an admission that he 
would revolt unless he was pardoned. It does not implicate Choumnos or anyone 
else to the conspiracy. It also seems that none of the revolts and conspiracies in 
Asia Minor reflected any reaction of the aristocracy against the throne. Shortly 
after the recovery of Constantinople, Michael VIII faced the dissatisfaction of 
the Anatolian soldiers. However, it seems that his policy of expansion westwards, 
one of the effects of which was the negligence of the Anatolian frontier, served 
the interests of the aristocracy the members of which had received privileges and 
grants of land in the newly annexed territories in the Balkans51. In addition, it 
is probable that while he faced the discontent and bitterness of the Anatolian 
soldiers, Andronikos II protected the financial interests of the great aristocrats 
and monastic foundations.  Privileged people and institutions suffered much less 
than others in the 1290s and 1300s52.
In conclusion, compared with rebellions like that of Alexios Philanthropenos 
and the alleged conspiracies of Constantine Palaiologos and Michael 
Strategopoulos, the conspiracy of Kassianos was a small-scale rebellion. 
Nonetheless, it reflects the political, social and military realities in Bithynia 
    e deidad en las antiguas cosmogonías
50 Âşık Paşazade, §9, 10, 11, 22, 23; Hopwood, K. (1992).  “Low-level diplomacy between 
Byzantines and Ottoman Turks: the case of Bithynia”, eds. in J. Shepard - S. Franklin. 
Byzantine Diplomacy, Aldershot: Variorum, p151-155; Lowry, H. (2003). The Nature of the 
Early Ottoman State. New York: State University of New York, 66-70.
51  Kyritses, D. (1999). “The ‘Common Chrysobulls’ of Cities”, Vyzantina  Smmeikta, 13, 241. 
52 See Smyrlis, “Financial Crisis”, 79-80.
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in the first decade of the fourteenth century. In the aftermath of the battle of 
Bapheus, the increased Turkish raids and the fiasco of the employment of the 
Catalan Grand Company, the emperor sent Kassianos, a successful general who 
was a member of the extended imperial family to govern the important frontier 
province of Mesothynia. Like other leading generals before him, such as Michael 
Angelos, Constantine Palaiologos and Alexios Philanthropenos, Kassianos had 
either plans to take advantage of the declining imperial control over Anatolia and 
promote his personal interests by orchestrating a rebellion, or was forced to revolt 
because he was slandered by a rival official who had accused him of arranging 
a marriage alliance with Osman. Considering the gravity of this accusation and 
the fate of rebellious commanders before him, Kassianons decided not to present 
himself to the emperor. Kassianos seems to have been convinced that the emperor 
would find Bardales’ accusations reliable.  This reflects the lack of trust between 
the throne and the frontier commanders and their troops in Asia Minor. Like 
all rebellious commanders in Asia Minor before him, Kassianos was followed by 
disgruntled and alienated soldiers. The government in Constantinople had failed 
to defend their interests and protect their possessions and by the time Kassianos 
was appointed governor of Mesothynia many of them had already migrated to 
the western parts of the empire. Those who remained in Asia Minor would either 
begin to co-operate with the Turks or supported rebellious commanders, who 
like Kassianos, might had limited connections with the area but their military 
reputation was sufficient to attract them. 
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